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Abstract. Publicly provided health care implies considerable intergenera-
tional redistribution. The possibility of accumulating a fund or debt will a®ect the
degree of redistribution as well as how e±cient the ¯nancing of health care is. In a
voting model we study how governments inability to make binding long-term policy
commitments will a®ect the accumulation of a fund or debt. Today's government
will base its policy decisions on expectations about future governments behavior
and simply follow suit, which results in strong political inertia. Either a fund or
debt may therefore be upheld in political equilibrium. But no mechanism ensure
that it is at its optimal level. If there is fund in steady state, the more political
clout the old have the smaller will the fund be, i.e saving decrease. If there is debt,
however, a politically stronger old generation may imply a smaller debt, i.e. savings
increase.
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1. Introduction
Older people utilize more health care than younger people do. While this is true it is also
true that younger people are the main contributors to the funding of health care for the
elderly, through the taxes they pay. The combined e®ect is a signi¯cant redistribution
between generations. In fact, public provision of health care works very much like a pay-
as-you-go (PAYG) pension system: the current young contributes money which ¯nances
bene¯tsfor the current old. Andjust like the agingofpopulationsinwestern industrialized
countries will pose a challenge to governments' ability to pay for pensions, the ¯nancing
of health care will also present problems.
One feature that sets health care apart from PAYG pensions, however, is that for
health care there is no law regulating what level of services a person is entitled to when
old. This is unlike pensions which are usually tied to previous earnings (or alternatively
a ¯xed lump-sum), so that young people know with a reasonable degree of certainty how
large pension payments they will receive when they retire. The level of healthcare services
they will receive, on the other hand, will be decided on by the government then in power.
There is no way the incumbent government can commit future governments to a certain
cause of action, and what is done today can be undone in the future.
In this paper we study the politics of health care provision to the elderly, focusing
on issues connected to intergenerational redistribution. We construct an overlapping-
generations model in which people live for two periods: they are young and old. In order
to focus on peoples' political actions, the agents make no meaningful economic decisions.
They consume, pay taxes and vote in both periods of life. The only di®erence between
the young and the old is that only the old utilize health care.
The function maximized by politicians is here taken to be exogenous, but it can be
motivated by a probabilistic voting model. The politicians in the model have short time
horizons|they only care about people alive at the time for the election. But since the
young care about the future when casting their votes in today's election, politicians haveIntergenerational redistribution, health care and politics 3
to take into account how the policy decisions taken today will a®ect policy decisions taken
by the government in power tomorrow.
Among the questions we then address are: To what extent will expectations about
future governments' decisions matter for the decisions taken by today's government? Is
it possible to sustain a trust-fund, i.e. a fund accumulated in order to help ¯nance health
care in the future? Or will the risk that it can be raided by future governments (to reduce
taxes or ¯nance other expenditures) prevent the accumulation of such a fund?
The issue of how policy is set when policy cannot be ¯xed for more than one time
period and di®erent generations are involved in a dynamic game, have been studied in
other papers. In Krusell and R¶ ³os-Rull (1996, 1999) they rely on numerical analysis, while
in Grossman and Helpman (1998) and Hassler et al (2001) they|just like we do|work
out analytical solutions to the Markov perfect equilibria.
Our paper is most closely related to the paper by Grossman and Helpman, in that
no private economic decisions are taken. Our model di®ers from theirs in that we allow
governments to accumulate a fund (alternatively issue debt).1 Another di®erence yet, is
that we focus more on demographics|the relative sizes of di®erent generations|which
allow us to relate our results to the discussion about whether a PAYG or a fully funded
pension system istoprefer. Finally, in our model both young and oldpay taxes, something
that has important implications.
We ¯nd that a fund can be sustained in steady state equilibrium. The exact value of
the fund is uncertain due to the existence of multiple equilibria; which equilibrium one
ends up in depends on expectations. Some equilibria are better than others, a better
equilibrium being one that requires the government to levy less taxes for a given level of
health care expenditure. There is no ¯rst order bias in the size of the fund, it can either be
too small or too large. A general characteristic, however, is that the fund in steady state
1In the Grossman and Helpman model the state variable is the capital stock. But the capital stock
depreciates entirely in one period, requiring each generation to reaccumulate the capital stock from
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equilibrium isnot adjusted enough inresponse to, for instance, the population growth rate
being larger than the interest rate. So, although in this situation it is optimal to ¯nance
health care entirely out of current taxes (or, even better, to run a de¯cit), a positive fund
might be passed on from generation to generation, keeping taxes high for the bene¯t of
nobody.
One of the main ¯ndings in the Grossman and Helpman paper is that when the
political process gives extra weight to the old, the extra bene¯t they enjoy will come at
the expense of young's savings. Resulting in a lower capital stock or slowed growth. A
politically strong old generation is therefore detrimental to welfare. In our model this need
not be the case. First, the e®ect on savings of giving extra weight to old is uncertain. For
instance, if we start out with a large enough debt, giving extra weight to old people will
reduce the debt, i.e. savings increase. Second, increased savings is welfare improving only
if the real interest rate is larger than population growth|which, of course, is a standard
result. So, whether giving extra weight to the old in the political process is a good or a
bad thing cannot be given a general answer.
2. The model
To focus on politics we propose a simple overlapping generation model where agents' only
decision is to vote. Agents live for two periods. In both periods of life, an agent receives




y) be the endowment when young and when old,
respectively. Both young and old agents alive at time t pay a lump-some tax ¿t. In
addition, the old bene¯t from health expenditure which is publicly provided. Let ht be
the health status of the old agents at time t and let ± 2 [0;1] be the discount factor. We
denote by UY
t the life time discounted utility of a young agent at time t and by UO
t the
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Additionally we assume that health provision is costly, with cost function c(h) = h2=2.
The only role for the government in our model is to levy taxes and provide health to the
old. At each time period the health expenditure can be ¯nanced with current taxes ¿t
and/or with past savings (trust fund) ft. We assume that the market interest rate is r,
that the population grows at rate n and normalize the size of the old to 1.
Assume that the government in o±ce maximizes a weighted average of the (expected)
lifetime utilities of the potential voters, with the young receiving weight 1+n and the old
weight µ: The government, which cannot commit to future taxes and health expenditure,
chooses current taxes and health expenditure to maximize Gt:








t+1; the superscript e denotingexpectations. This
political objective function can be motivated from so called probabilistic voting models,
in which politicians are opportunistic, i.e. purely o±ce motivated. For instance, Lindbeck
and Weibull (1989) and Dixit and Londregan (1996), set up models where voters di®er
in their ideological conviction and decide how to vote based on both ideology and which
party o®ers the highest economic utility. There are two political parties, Right and Left,
which both try to win the electionby maximizing their respective vote shares. The authors
then show that the parties choose their (identical) platforms to maximize a weighted sum
of the groups' utilities. The weights re°ect population size and how responsive the voters
of a group are to economic policy, that is how each group rewards policy with votes at
the election.
In our model, each government inheritsa trust fund, ft; from the previousgovernment.
By choosing ¿t and ht the government decides the trust fund ft+1 to be passed on to theIntergenerational redistribution, health care and politics 6
next generation,





To set current policies (taxes and health today) the government has to look ahead
one period since those agents who are young today will be alive tomorrow and therefore
a®ected by tomorrow's policies. This means that each government when setting the lump
sum tax ¿t and the health provision ht has to forecast tomorrow's government's policies
(¿t+1;ht+1). If we do not constrain these forecasts in any way there will be many policy
paths that are self-ful¯lling. To limit the number of potential paths we will restrict
attention to Markov equilibria, as ¯rst suggested by Krusell et al (1997). The Markov
assumption implies that policies expected for time t will depend only on the values for
the state variable expected at that time. Translated to our model, this means that the
tax rate and health expenditure at any time t depend only on the value of the fund at
time t, ft. And if at a future date t + j the value of the fund happens to be the same,
ft = ft+j, the governments will behave similarly. The political equilibrium will, thus, be
two stationary functions H : R ! R+ and T : R ! R, relating the tax policy and the
health expenditure to the value of the fund. More formally, let ¿t = T(ft); ht = H(ft)
be the policy functions and write the government's objective function as
max
¿t;ht
Gt = (1+ n)(!
y ¡¿t + ±(!
o ¡T (ft+1) + H (ft+1)) +
µ(!
o ¡¿t + ht)
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0(ft+1) = 0 (4)
to derive a solution.



















µ + 1+ n
= h(µ; n); (7)
where expression (6) holds for arbitrary values of A.
These expressions deserve a few comments. First, we have multiplicity of equilibria,
namely di®erent tax schedules (6) such that the ¯rst order conditions hold. Governments
in di®erent periods are willing to follow policy function (6) under the expectations that
all future governments will stick to the same policy function.
2
Second, health care expenditures do not depend on expectations. In fact, health
provision depend only on the demographics of the population and on the weight given to
the old in the government objective function. So the fund, f, a®ects only the costs for
current tax payers of health provision, but not the level of health provision. Notice also
that the e±cient level of health care provision is h = 1, i.e. argmaxh(h¡c(h)) = 1. This
2The upper limit to the tax rate sets an upper bound to the values A can take in equilibrium since
the government in power at time t+ 1 cannot be expected to follow (6) if T(ft+1) > !o:Intergenerational redistribution, health care and politics 8
level of provision is achieved only when µ = 1 since h(1; n) = 1 for all n. The reason
why health care might be provided in ine±cient amounts is that both the old and the
young are constrained to pay the same lump-sum tax.
3 To see this better, notice that in




o ¡¿t +h(µ;n) · !
o ¡¿t + 1+c(h(µ; n) ¡c(1) 8µ (8)
since
h(µ; n) ¡c(h(µ; n) < 1¡c(1) 8µ 6= 1:
From (8) we can see that the current old are willing to pay extra taxes to cover the
di®erence, c(1) ¡ c(h(µ; n); whenever µ < 1; just to get the e±cient level of health.
Similarly they are willing to sacri¯ce the excess health above 1 in exchange for a lower
tax whenever µ > 1: Notice that young agents' utility is not lowered with such a change.
Third, after substituting (5) in (3), one can easily see that the ¯rst order condition
holds with equality for all possible tax rates ¿t: This equation illustrates the con°ict of
interest between the young and the old in our model. The old agents' utility is larger the
lower the tax rate today. In fact, an increase in today's tax rate decreases their consump-
tion by the same amount while leaving the health care they are entitled to unchanged.
This has a negative e®ect of ¡µ on the government objective function. Young agents, on
the other hand, know that if future governments follow (6), a lower tax rate today (and
hence a lower fund tomorrow) will mean a higher tax rate tomorrow. The net e®ect of
an increase in ¿t for the young is positive and equal to (µ=(1+ n)): Consequently, young
agent's lifetime utility is higher the higher today's tax rate. This positive e®ect on the
young's utility of an increase in the tax rate has weight (1+n) on the government objec-
3If we allow for di®erent tax rates for the old, ¿o 2 [¡!y;!o]; and the young, ¿y 2 [¡!o;!y], it is easy
to show that when ± = 1; ht = 1 for all t, ¿o = ¡µft +A and ¿ y = !y when µ > 1;¿y = ¡!o when µ < 1
and ¿y 2 [¡!o;!y] when µ = 1:Intergenerational redistribution, health care and politics 9
tive and cancels out with the negative e®ect on the old. Hence, any ¿ satis¯es condition
(3).
Since today's government, given its expectations, is indi®erent in its choice of ¿t, they
are willing to behave in the same manner they expect tomorrow's government to behave,
i.e. according to (6).











To simplify, from now on we will assume that ± = 1. Note that the di®erence equation




(n ¡r) +1 +n + µ
: (10)






2 (¡1; 1): (11)
(11) is satis¯ed whenever
µ < 1+ r:
From the budget constraint, we solve for ¿SS
¿
SS(2+ n) = f
SS(n ¡r) +c(h(µ;n)): (12)
First, note that since we have restricted ¿t to be no larger than !o a steady state with
fSS(n¡r) ¸ 0 can only be sustained if the current generation can pay for the health pro-
vision, namely when (2+n)!o > c(h(µ; n)): Second, accumulating a fund is not bene¯cial
in all circumstances. Only when the interest rate is larger than the population growth,
i.e. n > r, will the existence of a fund be welfare improving since the tax rate is lower
than otherwise. Notice that when n < r, the steady tax rate is higher the higher theIntergenerational redistribution, health care and politics 10
steady state fund. The reason why the young vote for such a high ¿SS is because they
assume that next generation will follow the tax schedule (6) and a lower tax today (lower
ft+1) implies a higher tax tomorrow. In order to illustrate how maintaining a fund can
reduce welfare, assume for the sake of simplicity that the government gives weight zero
to the old, namely µ = 0: In this case the optimal health provision is 0 and so is the cost,




(n ¡r) +1+ n
> 0 and ¿
SS =
A(n ¡r)
(2+ n)((n ¡r) + 1+n)
> 0: (13)
and positives taxes can be sustained in equilibrium while everybody would be better of
with no taxes at all.
We now substitute (10) in (12) to get an expression for ¿SS as a function of the
parameters of the model and of the expectations A,
¿
SS =
A(n ¡r) + c(h(µ; n))(µ + 1+ n)
(2+ n)((n ¡r) + 1+ n +µ)
: (14)
Notice that both steady state values, (10) and (12), depend on the expectations A;
since the tax schedule is determined up to the constant A.
3. Political clout
In papers analyzing the political economy of pensions, a main conclusion is that power-
ful political forces support the introduction of pay-as-you-go pensions which is excessive
relative to the social optimum (ch. 6, Persson and Tabellini, 2000). One of the \political
distortions"keepingpublic pensions too high is that future generations, though very much
a®ected by the system, do not vote on it. This is a result derived under the assumption
that commitment is possible; once in place the social security system remains for more
than one period. Is there a problem even if no commitment is possible, as in our model?
Will a politically powerful old generation reduce steady state welfare because it makes
politicians short-sighted?Intergenerational redistribution, health care and politics 11
We will answer this question by looking at how lifetime utility for a representative
generation vary with the relative political strength of young and old. We earlier estab-
lished that the e±cient level of health care provision is h = 1 and that this will only be
achieved in our model when µ = 1 due to the fact that young and old are constrained
to pay the same lump-sum tax. But the fact is that given this constraint on taxes, and
hence that we are in a second-best situation, we do not know whether the e±cient level
of health care provision, h = 1, is the one that maximizes lifetime utility.
To see what the second-best optimal health provision is, assume that expectations are
such that fSS = 0; namely A = c(h(µ; n)): Lifetime utility for a representative generation
(net of endowments)
h(µ; n) ¡2¿




is maximized at h = (2 + n)=2. The e®ect of population growth is equivalent to a cost
reduction since each agent pays 2¿
SS; but gets (2+n)¿
SS in health expenditure. Lifetime
utility will then be maximized at µ = 1 + n; so the old should have more (less) political
clout than the young when the population is growing (contracting).
If taxes on young and old are allowed to be di®erent, health care provision will be
independent of relative political clout, µ, and always at the e±cient level h = 1. If the
old and the young pay the same tax (second best), health care provision will depend on
relative political clout and it will be larger the more political clout old have. Moreover,
lifetime utility in steady state will not be maximized when the e±cient level of health care
is provided, unless the population is constant over time. If there is population growth we
should have more health care than the e±cient level.
Now we want to see what the e®ect of µ on lifetime utility iswhenthere is afund(debt)
in steady state. First note that when the steady state fund fSS(µ; n;r; A) is positive it is






SS(µ; n; r; A) S ¡
(1 +n)(2+ n)2µ
(1+ n +µ)3 = f(µ; n):
Notice that f(µ; n) takes value 0 at µ = 0; is negative for all µ > 0; reaches a minimum
at µ = (1 + n)=2 and limµ!1 f(µ; n) = 0. For all A < 0, fSS(0; n; r; A) < f(0; n) and
giving some weight to the old reduces the debt. Moreover, we can always ¯nd a low
enough A such that the steady state debt is always decreasing in µ. In fact for all A < ¹ A;
fSS(µ; n; r;A) is increasing in µ where








(2+ n)((n ¡r) +1+ n + µ)
+ h(µ; n) ¡
2c(h(µ; n))(µ + 1+ n)
(2+ n)((n ¡r) + 1+ n +µ)
: (15)
Substituting h(µ; n) we get
¡
2A(n ¡r)
(2+n)((n ¡r) + 1+ n + µ)
+
µ(2+n)((n ¡r) + 1+n)
(µ + 1+ n)((n ¡r) + 1+n + µ)
: (16)
The second term achieves a maximum at µ =
p
(1+n)(1+ n + (n ¡r)). The ¯rst term
is decreasing (increasing) in µ whenever A(n ¡r) < 0 (A(n ¡r) > 0). It is easy to see,
adding the two terms that the µ that maximizes lifetime utility is smaller (larger) than
p
(1+ n)(1+ n +(n ¡r)) whenever A(n ¡r) < 0 (A(n ¡r) > 0).
If n = r lifetime utility is maximized at µ = 1+n which is the same as if no fund was
available. To have a fund is desirable only when r > n since the returns of the fund canIntergenerational redistribution, health care and politics 13
be used to lower the tax rate. When n > r to keep a fund in steady state is ine±cient. By
increasing the weight given to the old, the ine±ciency due to the existence of a positive
fund is reduced since the steady state fund is decreasing in µ: This is why it would be
optimal to give to the old a higher weight. The argument goes in the opposite direction
when r > n. In this case the larger the fund the better (and hence it pays to reduce µ).
The optimal µ is, in this case, smaller than (1 +n).








Steady state utility (U ss) as a function of µ:
Figure 2 illustrates how the lifetime utility, U
SS; changes with µ: We have plotted U
SS
for n = r (solid line), n > r (thick dashed line) and n < r (thin dashed line) and a value
of A > c(h(µ; n)) for all µ: Notice that when r = n the maximum is reached at µ = 1+n:
Since, given A, fSS > 0 for all µ; the maximum is reached at a µ < 1 + n (µ > 1 + n)
when r > n (r < n), since fSS is decreasing in µ:
4. Conclusions
This paper is, to the best of our knowledge, the ¯rst one which studies how health care
policy is shaped by the con°ict of interest between young and old due to the intergener-
ational redistribution inherent in public provision of health care. To study this question
we propose a simple political economy model which incorporates both intergenerational
con°ict of interest and governments' incentives in elections. In particular we analyze how
the fact that the government in power only consider the welfare of living generations when
making policy, a®ect welfare in the long-run.Intergenerational redistribution, health care and politics 14
Our model features multiple expectational equilibria. Since in equilibrium govern-
ments in all periods have the same expectations there is a strong political inertia. This
inertia gives rise to one of the main results of the paper, namely that a fund (debt) can
be sustained in equilibrium even though everybody would be better o® without a fund
(debt). There is no mechanism that ensures that a good equilibrium will be selected.
We also analyze how the relative political clout of young and old a®ects steady state
welfare. How strong the old are compared to the young a®ects both the amount of health
care that is provided and how large taxes are. The main conclusion is that if the old are
either too strong or too weak lifetime utility for a representative generation will su®er.
Whether the old should be politically stronger or weaker than the young depends both on
expectations and on whether population growth is higher or lower than the real interest
rate.
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